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Introduction
There has been rapid growth in the availability and use of 
small-scale drones1 in recent years, driven by the private 
benefits available to the drone operator. For a recreational 
operator the motivation may be enjoyment, but for the 
commercial operator there is the ability to gather information 
at lower cost and lower risk than previously possible, and 
potentially to gather information that could not previously  
be gathered in a cost-effective manner. Drones also give rise 
to a number of costs, most notably safety-related and privacy-
related, which by their nature are borne by third parties.  
A mechanism is required for the drone operator to internalise 
these costs if efficient use of drones is to be achieved. 
and delivery services. One New Zealand 
study (Shelley and Andrews, 2015) 
estimates the potential gross benefits to 
be, in monetary terms: nearly $1 billion 
per annum from improved pasture 
management on sheep, beef and dairy 
farms; up to $95 million per annum from 
improved control of a common radiata 
pine fungus and an insect pest; and up 
to $7 million per annum from electricity 
infrastructure asset inspection, with a 
further benefit of up to $20 million per 
annum from reduced duration of power 
outages. Benefits not quantifiable include 
the ability to conduct real-time traffic 
monitoring (sUAS News, 2015) and 
activities such natural disaster response 
(Measure and American Red Cross, 
2015).
While not common occurrences, small 
drones have injured people, including 
hitting and cutting a triathlete’s head 
during a race (Grubb, 2014), knocking a 
woman unconscious at a public parade 
(CBS News, 2015) and injuring a baby at 
a public event (Henry 2015). Small drones 
have been used to deliver contraband 
to prisons in both the United Kingdom 
and the United States (Brandes, 2015; 
Glanfield, 2015); have crashed into 
overhead electricity lines, causing power 
cuts, in both New Zealand and the United 
States (Dinsdale, 2015; Serna, 2015); 
and crashed at major sporting events 
(Waldstein, 2015). There are concerns 
that small drones could be used by 
terrorist groups to launch bomb attacks 
(Hughes, 2015). Drones have been used 
to conduct numerous unauthorised flights 
The proliferation in drone availability and 
use has been reflected in the number of 
incidents and concerns reported to the 
New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority. 
Authority statistics indicate that from 
2008 to 2010 there was approximately one 
report per year notified to the authority. 
This has grown to 120 reports for the 
2015 calendar year.2 Commercial uses for 
drones include infrastructure inspection, 
surveying, general aerial photography, 
precision agriculture, search and rescue, 
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over French nuclear power plants, raising 
speculation about whether the flights 
are a precursor to ground-based attack 
(Lichfield, 2014; Baylon, 2014). Following 
reports that small drones have come 
within feet of passenger planes (see, for 
example, Brooks-Pollock, 2014), research 
has indicated that a 3.6kg drone could 
fracture the turbine blades of a jet aircraft, 
rapidly destroying the entire engine, which 
can potentially cause structural damage to 
the aircraft and even a catastrophic fire 
(Mackay, 2015; Wasserman, 2015; ATSB, 
2013; Gates, 2015).
There has also been rising public 
concern about privacy issues associated 
with drones. New Zealand has seen 
newspaper articles about drones being 
used to film another person’s property 
and to take photos of children at a public 
swimming pool (Harris, 2015; Bonnallack 
and Young, 2015). While the latter incident 
involved a father photographing his 
children at a school swimming sports 
(Bonnallack, 2015), the reporting of 
it highlights a general disquiet among 
the public about potential violation of 
privacy. In Australia a woman discovered 
that real estate advertisements, including 
a large billboard, carried an image of her 
sunbathing in her backyard (Panahi, 2014). 
This incident illustrates that surveillance 
and privacy violations can occur without 
trespass, such as when a drone is located 
over a neighbouring property or public 
way such as a road, footpath or walkway. 
It also demonstrates that privacy violations 
may be inadvertent: in this instance the 
woman happened to be sunbathing next 
door to the property that was the focus of 
the aerial footage. 
In New Zealand the civil aviation rules 
currently contain a default requirement 
for drone operators to obtain permission 
to fly over persons or property (Civil 
Aviation Authority, 2015b, rule 101.207(a)
(1)). However, civil aviation regulation is 
concerned solely with matters of safety, so 
if an operator can demonstrate a sufficient 
level of safety, then that restriction can be 
removed (Civil Aviation Authority, 2015a, 
p.12). Furthermore, these rules have no 
effect on non-trespassory surveillance. 
While the civil aviation rules may have 
incidental benefits for privacy in some 
situations, addressing the potential problem 
of privacy violations perpetrated with the 
aid of a drone must rely on an appropriate 
framework of privacy regulation.
Gavison (1980) suggests that there 
are three fundamental and independent 
elements of privacy: secrecy, anonymity 
and solitude. Westin (1967) argued that 
the control of personal information lies at 
the heart of privacy, but this is a facet of 
Gavison’s secrecy. Secrecy and anonymity 
are arguably the foundation of New 
Zealand’s tort of wrongful publication of 
private facts, and solitude the foundation 
of the tort of intrusion on seclusion, while 
the right to control personal information 
about oneself lies at the heart of New 
Zealand’s Privacy Act 1993.
An additional value closely related to 
privacy is autonomy, which is the ability to 
make life decisions free from the influence 
or control of others (Thompson, 2015). 
Autonomy is a privacy value that may be 
threatened by widespread use of drones, 
as individuals feel that they must change 
or moderate their private behaviour 
in the face of potential surveillance 
(Martin, 2013). The perceived need 
to alter behaviour was demonstrated 
by an experiment undertaken in 
Helsinki, which studied the effects on 
ten volunteer households of ubiquitous 
surveillance within each home over a 
period of six months (Oulasvirta et al., 
2012). The Helsinki Privacy Experiment 
demonstrated that even individuals who 
consent to surveillance will actively alter 
their behaviour in order to regulate 
what those carrying out the surveillance 
perceive, and the surveillance system was 
‘a cause of annoyance, concern, anxiety, 
and even rage’. These emotions may 
be sufficiently strong that individuals 
are motivated to undertake prima facie 
illegal behaviours, such as attempting to 
shoot down or otherwise destroy a drone. 
In the United States drones have been 
shot down in New Jersey, Kentucky and 
California. In all three cases the shooter 
justified their actions by claiming that 
they were protecting their right to privacy 
(Smoking Gun, 2015; Cummings, 2015; 
Farivar, 2015). 
The negative emotions experienced by 
those subject to perceived privacy violations, 
and the behavioural responses observed 
in the Helsinki experiment, are economic 
costs to those involved. Such responses may 
also involve behaviours – such as the firing 
of a gun – that create risks, and therefore 
economic costs, to others. An efficient level 
of drone activity can only be achieved if 
the economic costs drones induce are taken 
into account by drone operators, which in 
turn requires a mechanism to transfer those 
costs to the drone operator. It is the role of 
the legal and regulatory system to facilitate 
this transfer.
The remainder of this article first 
summarises relevant aspects of the 
technology associated with drones to 
provide an appreciation of some of the 
challenges that might arise in a legal 
and policy context. It then considers 
privacy regulation in New Zealand by 
way of the privacy torts, the Privacy 
Act 1993 and other relevant legislation. 
The tort of intrusion on seclusion is 
potentially highly relevant, although 
there are questions over whether the 
threshold of ‘highly offensive’ will prove 
to be too high. The Privacy Act creates 
a wrong of ‘interference with privacy’ 
that is potentially applicable to drones. 
This article considers practical issues 
with enforcement and concludes with 
suggested clarifications to the privacy 
regulatory framework.
Drone technology
A drone is the colloquial name for what 
is officially known as a remotely piloted 
aircraft system or unmanned aircraft 
system: a flying machine without a pilot 
on board. In its typical use this term 
encompasses unmanned fixed-wing 
aircraft and unmanned helicopters (with 
There has also been rising public 
concern about privacy issues associated 
with drones.
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any number of rotors). A drone consists 
of the flying machine and the attendant 
control systems, which may include some 
means of remotely controlling the craft 
from a distance, such as radio control.
Whereas traditional radio-controlled 
aircraft are flown within sight of the 
operator, small drones3 increasingly have 
two technologies that enable them to 
be flown beyond the line of sight of the 
operator, even though such operations 
are generally not legal. First, many small 
drones can be programmed to follow a 
series of GPS waypoints so that they can 
fly a pre-set path over points of interest. 
The GPS waypoints will be generated on 
a software application that typically uses 
Google Maps, so it is possible to identify 
with a high degree of precision a specific 
address, house or location that the drone 
is to fly to. The operator of the drone is 
able to watch the progress of the aircraft 
on a screen, without needing to physically 
observe the craft. Second, small drones 
may have ‘first-person view’ technology, 
which transmits the video from a camera 
mounted on the drone back to the 
operator. First-person view enables the 
operator to see the view through the 
drone camera and pilot the craft as if on 
board the drone itself. 
‘Nano-UAVs’ (drones weighing less 
than 500g) may lack some of these 
technologies, but even a hand-sized nano-
UAV weighing just 50g, including battery, 
is still capable of carrying a camera 
and operating with first-person view.4 
Some nano-UAVs have been developed 
specifically for surveillance purposes, 
mimicking birds and insects to reduce the 
likelihood of detection (see, for example, 
Ackerman, 2011).
A small drone is typically configured 
so that the video is broadcast back to 
the pilot. This imagery can be recorded. 
Older drones and nano-UAVs may simply 
record imagery on a memory card for 
later viewing.
New Zealand privacy law
New Zealand has two privacy torts: 
wrongful publication of private facts 
and intrusion on seclusion. These torts 
are heavily complemented by both civil 
and criminal statutes, and remain an 
area where further relevant development 
is possible. This section reviews the two 
privacy torts and then gives particular 
consideration to how the Privacy Act 
might apply to drones. Other relevant 
statute is then briefly reviewed.
Privacy torts
The confirmation of the existence of 
the privacy torts is a relatively new 
development in New Zealand law. 
Wrongful publication of private facts was 
confirmed as a tort by the Court of Appeal 
in Hosking v Runting [2004] NZCA 34. 
The elements of this tort are:
1.  The existence of facts in respect 
of which there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy; and
2.  Publicity given to those private facts 
that would be considered highly 
offensive to an objective reasonable 
person.
The tort of intrusion on seclusion 
was found to be part of New Zealand 
law in the High Court in C v Holland 
[2012] NZHC 2155. Justice Whata held 
that the following four elements must be 
satisfied:
(a) An intentional and unauthorised 
intrusion;
(b) into seclusion (namely intimate 
personal activity, space or affairs); 
(c) involving infringement of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy;
(d) that is highly offensive to a 
reasonable person.
What might be considered the key 
distinguishing factor between wrongful 
publication and intrusion on seclusion 
is that publication is not required for 
the latter tort. This may be particularly 
relevant when imagery is collected for the 
private use of a drone operator without 
necessarily an intention to publish the 
imagery.
Some commentators have questioned 
whether the tort of intrusion on seclusion 
is too tightly formulated. For example, 
Anderson (2012) notes Justice Whata’s 
acceptance of there being ‘no right to 
limit views from public places or from 
other private property’, which potentially 
allows surveillance and photography 
from afar.
The ‘highly offensive’ test
Both privacy torts require the violation of 
privacy to be ‘highly offensive’. In C v Holland 
the intrusion involved covert filming of 
a woman in the shower, so easily met the 
threshold of the ‘highly offensive’ test. In 
Hosking v Runting the action in contention 
was the publication of a photograph of 18-
month-old twins, taken in a public place, 
and this did not meet the threshold. A 
drone filming a person sunbathing naked 
in their backyard might be considered an 
analogous situation to that in C v Holland 
and therefore likely to meet the threshold. 
Imagery of dead or injured persons at the 
scene of a traffic accident or shooting may 
also meet the threshold.
Moreham (2008) argues that the ‘highly 
offensive’ test is unnecessary, noting that 
English law avoids the use of that test by 
relying on the ‘reasonable expectation of 
privacy’ test. The ‘highly offensive’ test is, 
he argues, also unpredictable and creates 
uncertainty. There is no easy formula to 
apply, with the only guidance being that 
the disclosure must be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. 
It is unclear whether the filming of 
ordinary activities such as gardening or 
children playing games in a backyard 
where there is a reasonable expectation 
of privacy would be considered highly 
offensive, even if the individuals involved 
experienced considerable anxiety at 
potentially being observed.
There is considerable uncertainty over 
whether the privacy torts provide any 
effective cause of action against privacy 
violations by drone. The cost of bringing 
a claim is high, with the claimant also 
facing the costs of the defendant if 
the claim is not successful. Given the 
New Zealand has two privacy torts: 
wrongful publication of private facts and 
intrusion on seclusion ...
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uncertainties over success, the potentially 
high costs will act to deter claims and 
effectively allow tortious conduct to 
continue. In such a situation, regulation 
is favoured over tort (Shavell, 1984).
Privacy Act 1993
The primary regulatory instrument 
governing privacy in New Zealand is 
the Privacy Act 1993, which governs the 
collection, use and disclosure of personal 
information. The Privacy Act requires an 
‘agency’ to comply with a set of 12 broad 
‘information privacy principles’. An 
agency is ‘any person or body of persons, 
whether corporate or unincorporate, 
and whether in the public sector or 
the private sector’,5 and thus includes a 
drone operator, whether that operator 
is an individual flying recreationally or a 
company utilising a drone for commercial 
operations.
While the information privacy principles 
of the act do not directly create a legal right 
enforceable in a court of law,6 section 66 
creates a civil wrong of ‘interference with 
privacy’. Interference with privacy requires 
that the action in question breaches an 
information privacy principle (or one of 
four other specified breaches)7 and in the 
opinion of the privacy commissioner or the 
Human Rights Review Tribunal has caused 
or may cause some harm to the individual. 
An action in the tribunal may be at the 
suit of either the director of human rights 
proceedings (Privacy Act 1993, section 82) 
or the aggrieved party (section 83), and 
may be appealed to the High Court.8 The 
aggrieved party may only bring suit after 
the Office of the Privacy Commissioner 
has investigated the complaint, and the 
scope of the tribunal’s hearing is restricted 
to the issues investigated by the privacy 
commissioner.
In both New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom unmanned aerial 
systems are considered to be a form of 
closed circuit television (CCTV) and 
subject to the same privacy regulation 
as CCTV (Mabbett, 2015; Information 
Commissioner’s Office, 2015). In Armfield 
v Naughton [2014] NZHRRT 48, the 
tribunal considered issues related to a 
CCTV system that in part surveilled the 
front yard of a neighbouring property. 
Naughton had set up a number of CCTV 
security cameras around his house, one 
of which had an unobstructed view of 
Armfield’s lawn and of the swing used 
by Armfield’s children. The tribunal held 
that the camera recording part of the 
front yard collected personal information 
in a way that intruded to an unreasonable 
extent on the personal affairs of the 
people living at Armfield’s property. 
Whether the surveillance was ‘highly 
offensive’ as required by the privacy torts 
was not considered by the tribunal as its 
jurisdiction is limited to the Privacy Act.
Armfield v Naughton confirmed 
previous decisions that ‘injury to feelings’ 
includes negative feelings such as anxiety, 
stress, fear and anger; that is, all of the 
feelings associated with unwelcome 
surveillance. Damages were awarded for 
‘humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to 
the feelings of the aggrieved individual’. A 
benchmark of $15,000 in damages was 
noted by the tribunal, although a lesser 
amount was awarded effectively at the 
request of the plaintiff.
Personal information is defined in 
the Privacy Act as ‘information about 
an identifiable individual’. Whether an 
individual can be clearly identified from 
drone imagery depends on the quality 
of the camera on board the drone and 
the distance between the drone and the 
person. A person on the ground is unable 
to determine whether photography 
is occurring, or whether they can be 
identified from any imagery. Furthermore, 
when the address at which imagery is taken 
is known, it may be possible to identify 
the individual from certain characteristics 
such as build and hair colour. Thus, even 
when the imagery is at a relatively low 
resolution, it is reasonable to assume that 
personal information is being gathered.
We can therefore conclude that 
(1) a drone that flies in the vicinity of 
a property and takes photos of that 
property is potentially collecting personal 
information; and (2) a person who is in 
some way upset, anxious or angry about 
such an action has suffered an ‘injury 
to feelings’. Having satisfied the second 
limb of section 66, the only remaining 
requirement to prove an interference 
to privacy is whether the personal 
information collected breaches an 
information privacy principle. 
Information privacy principle 1 
requires that ‘the information is collected 
for a lawful purpose connected with a 
function or activity of the agency, and 
the collection of information is necessary 
for that purpose’. Flying a drone 
recreationally is not an unlawful purpose, 
but it is not clear that collection of 
personal information by way of imagery 
is necessary for that purpose. Further, 
personal information may be collected 
incidentally when a drone is collecting 
imagery of an entirely different subject, 
and it is unclear whether this would 
contravene this principle.
Information privacy principle 4 requires, 
inter alia, that personal information shall not 
be collected by an agency ‘by means that, in 
the circumstances of the case … intrude to 
an unreasonable extent upon the personal 
affairs of the individual concerned’. Whereas 
intrusion on seclusion requires the intrusion 
to be ‘highly offensive’, the Privacy Act merely 
requires the collection of information to 
intrude to ‘an unreasonable extent’. The 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner notes 
that it is almost certainly unreasonably 
intrusive to capture imagery of ‘a person’s 
private front or back yard or any other 
place where they are likely to expect privacy’ 
(Privacy Commissioner, 2009, p.13), a 
position upheld in Armfield v Naughton. 
... real estate photography is a lawful 
purpose, but it is unclear whether the use 
of a drone to collect that imagery intrudes 
to an unreasonable extent on the privacy 
of a person in a neighbouring property.
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The Australian sunbathing incident 
(Panahi, 2014) is illustrative of some 
of the difficulties faced in applying 
the Privacy Act to drones: real estate 
photography is a lawful purpose, but it 
is unclear whether the use of a drone 
to collect that imagery intrudes to an 
unreasonable extent on the privacy of 
a person in a neighbouring property. 
However, there may be an arguable case 
for an unreasonable intrusion when 
imagery is deliberately collected about 
an individual or property but consent 
has not been obtained, such as occurred 
in Armfield v Naughton.
Information privacy principle 6 
requires that where an agency holds 
personal information in a form that 
can be readily retrieved, the individual 
concerned has a right to obtain 
confirmation of whether information 
is held and to access that information 
(i.e. view the footage that pertains to the 
individual). However, enforcing that right 
may be difficult, as it may be difficult to 
identify the drone operator. 
In sum, footage deliberately collected 
without permission of someone’s front 
or backyard is likely to breach at least 
one information privacy principle and 
thus might be an ‘interference with 
privacy’, but the status of information 
collected incidentally to a lawful purpose 
is unclear.
Crimes Act and Summary Offences Act
Part 9A of the Crimes Act 1961 creates 
a number of ‘crimes against personal 
privacy’, including interception of private 
communications, disclosure of private 
communications unlawfully intercepted, 
and making, possessing and distributing 
intimate visual recordings. An intimate 
visual recording is one made without the 
knowledge or consent of the person who 
is the subject of the recording, where the 
recording is of a person who is in a place 
that would reasonably be expected to 
provide privacy, and the person is engaged 
in an activity of an intimate or personal 
nature, or the recording is made from 
under a person’s clothing. Such conduct 
must be intentional or reckless. Of note, 
an intimate visual recording can be made 
and transmitted in real time without 
retention or storage. 
The prohibition against intimate 
visual recordings has potential application 
in some of the more extreme situations 
that might be envisaged involving drones. 
In the Australian sunbathing case, for 
example, the woman was in a place (a 
fenced backyard) that would reasonably be 
expected to provide privacy, and her state 
of dress meets the test in section 216G of 
the act. An important question is whether 
the conduct was intentional or reckless.
Section 30 of the Summary Offences 
Act 1981 creates an offence punishable by 
a fine of not more than $500 for ‘peeping 
or peering into a dwelling house’ at night. 
The offences of interception of private 
communications and peeping or peering 
into a dwelling house are additional 
to the actions available in tort,9 but 
in general would be of little help to 
those concerned about an unwanted 
drone hovering over their house or 
property because in most instances a 
drone will be gathering imagery rather 
than intercepting communications, and 
significant surveillance can be conducted 
without peeping into a house at night.
Discussion
People are generally concerned about 
their right to privacy, and unwelcome 
surveillance both impinges on this right 
and generates a range of emotions and 
changes in behaviour that can rightly 
be characterised as economic costs. The 
appropriate place to address issues of 
privacy and unwelcome surveillance lies 
within privacy law. 
New Zealand’s privacy torts 
require the publication or recording of 
information to be ‘highly offensive’, a 
threshold that is unclear for observation 
of people undertaking normal activities 
in their backyards. The Privacy Act 
provides an alternative cause of action 
for an ‘interference with privacy’. Imagery 
collected over time by CCTV of private 
front and backyards has been held 
to intrude to an unreasonable extent 
on privacy, and thus constitute an 
interference with privacy, but it is unclear 
whether a single drone flight collecting 
the same imagery would necessarily 
constitute an unreasonable intrusion. 
It is generally accepted that one ‘can 
take and/or publish photos or film of 
people where there is no expectation of 
privacy, such as a beach, shopping mall, 
park or other public place’ (New Zealand 
Police, 2016). However, Moreham 
suggests that the expectation of privacy 
in public places is a matter of degree, 
such that an individual will choose how 
much of themselves to reveal in any given 
public place, and ‘because it is always 
possible to disseminate an image of a 
person to a much wider audience than 
the one to which he or she was exposed’ 
(Moreham, 2006). There may, therefore, 
be circumstances in which drone imagery 
obtained in a public place may violate a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.
A significant difficulty also arises in 
identifying the pilot of a drone (Aldworth, 
2014). Manned aircraft are required to have 
prominently displayed registration marks, 
or an approved and readily identifiable 
paint scheme, and are large enough that 
visible markings can be easily identified. 
A drone, on the other hand, may be a 
generic off-the-shelf model that looks 
exactly the same as every other drone of 
that model, with no unique identifying 
marks that are readily visible. While 
regulation could require that a drone has 
some sort of registration marking, such 
regulations could be ignored almost with 
impunity. Furthermore, even if a drone 
The general public is concerned about 
the ability of drones to violate their 
privacy and surveil activities conducted 
in spaces where people have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.
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has a registration marking, the small size 
of the craft means that the registration 
marking will necessarily be small, 
inhibiting identification. The pilot may 
also not be visible to the occupier of the 
property, particularly if flying using first-
person view.
Two additional problems arise that 
reduce the expected damages cost to 
the drone operator. The first problem 
is one of asymmetric information: the 
potential victim does not know whether 
they are being recorded, which raises 
uncertainty over whether it is worth the 
cost of initiating an action or making a 
complaint to the privacy commissioner, 
particularly as the privacy commissioner 
has held that if a drone is not recording 
then there is no information collected, 
so no information privacy principle 
can be violated (Privacy Commissioner, 
2015). The second problem is that there 
is no guaranteed cause of action. An 
intrusion into seclusion must be highly 
offensive for an action in tort, and yet the 
boundary of that standard is undefined; 
an intrusion into seclusion must also 
be intentional, and the drone operator 
always has the opportunity to argue 
that any intrusion was unintentional 
or negligent. Similarly, an ‘interference 
with privacy’ requires the drone to have 
intruded to an unreasonable extent in the 
collection of personal information, and 
again relies on asymmetric information 
about whether information was even 
collected. 
Faced with such uncertainties, a 
smaller proportion of cases will be 
pursued than would be the case if there 
were certainty about the filming, and 
some of the cases that are pursued will 
fail. As discussed earlier, the probability 
of identifying the pilot is also very low. 
As a consequence of these factors, the 
expected damages cost borne by the 
drone operator will be a small fraction of 
the harm caused, and the drone operator 
will accordingly exercise insufficient care 
to avoid privacy violations. This can only 
be an efficient outcome if the cost of 
reducing or eliminating the uncertainty 
is very high and there are no other 
options for protecting privacy, such as 
destruction of the offending drone (for a 
discussion of the potential use of ‘violent 
self-defence’ against drones see Froomkin 
and Colangelo, 2015).
In sum, there are sufficient uncertainties 
in the application of the current body of 
tort and statute that a person upset by 
unwelcome surveillance cannot be sure 
of an acceptable resolution, even when 
that surveillance takes place in a location 
where they have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy. From an economic perspective 
this imposes uncompensated costs on the 
victim. More importantly, because the 
drone operator does not face the cost of 
his or her actions, he or she will not take 
sufficient precaution to avoid privacy 
violations and will have an activity level 
that is too high (Shavell, 1980).
Conclusion
The general public is concerned about 
the ability of drones to violate personal 
privacy and surveil activities conducted 
in spaces where people have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. Experimental 
evidence demonstrates that even 
individuals who consent to surveillance 
experience a range of negative emotions, 
including fear, anxiety and anger, and 
change their behaviours in response to 
surveillance. These negative emotions and 
the behaviour changes are economic costs 
that must be taken into account when 
determining the efficient use of drones.
An efficient outcome could in theory 
be achieved via tort. However, New 
Zealand’s privacy torts may set too high 
a standard (‘highly offensive’), and in 
any event this standard would need to be 
tested in court to definitively determine 
what level of drone surveillance meets 
the threshold. The costs of such action 
are high, effectively preventing tort 
from acting as an efficient mechanism 
for addressing privacy violations. The 
Privacy Act’s offence of an ‘interference 
with privacy’ potentially provides a 
mechanism that more readily facilitates 
the transfer of cost to the drone operator. 
However, the privacy commissioner has 
held that if a drone is not recording 
imagery then no ‘collection’ occurs, and 
hence no interference with privacy occurs. 
This provides the obvious incentive for 
any drone operator subject to a Privacy 
Act complaint, but who has not actually 
published imagery, to simply claim that 
no information was collected. Additional 
problems may arise in identification of 
the drone operator.
This article has identified areas 
where New Zealand’s current privacy 
framework requires clarification to better 
accommodate the challenges posed by 
drones. Some of the modifications could 
potentially be achieved by way of a code 
of practice issued under the Privacy Act, 
which may provide a relatively low-
cost means of setting the standard of 
acceptable behaviour. Challenges will 
still remain because the characteristics 
of drone technology make it difficult 
to identify the operator, which in turn 
makes it difficult to obtain any legal 
remedy. Such challenges may mean that 
in some instances an alternative, more 
direct means of intervening to protect 
one’s right to privacy would be efficient.
1 The term ‘drone’ is a colloquial expression for an unmanned 
aircraft that may be variously known as an unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV) or a remotely piloted aircraft (RPA). The 
term drone may also be used for the complete ‘system’ that 
encompasses the flying machine, telemetry links and ground 
control station, otherwise known as an unmanned aerial 
system (UAS) or remotely piloted aircraft system (RPAS). 
2 These reports may cover any aspect of drone activities, 
including crashes, close approaches to manned aircraft, 
operating in airspace where there is no authorisation. 
3 In the context of UAVs, ‘small’ is typically taken to mean 
25kg or less (US Department of Transportation, 2013).
4 The author owns a JJRC H6C quadcopter which has an all-
up weight of 50g, including quadcopter, battery and propeller 
guards.  The H6C is fitted with a 2MP camera that records 
still photos or video to a micro-SD card.  A different model of 
this quadcopter is fitted with FPV capabilities.
5 The definition of agency in the Privacy Act also includes 
a number of exceptions, none of which rule out a private 
individual collecting information about others.
6 Section 11 of the Privacy Act expressly provides that ‘the 
information privacy principles do not confer on any person 
any legal right that is enforceable in a court of law’, with the 
exception to obtain confirmation from a public sector agency 
of whether information is held, and to have access to that 
information.
7 The other breaches specified in section 66 of the act are a 
breach of: (a) a code of practice relating to public registers; 
(b) an IPP or code of practice related to information sharing 
agreements; (c) an information sharing agreement; and (d) 
provisions relating to information matching.
8 Appeals to the High Court are made under section 123 of the 
Human Rights Act 1993.
9 Section 405 of the Crimes Act 1961 expressly provides that 
‘no civil remedy for an act or omission shall be suspended by 
reason that such act or omission is an offence’.
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